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We investigate the effects of photon-number quantum-nondemolition measurements performed by
an eavesdropper on a two-photon correlated state. The relation between this model and quantum
cryptography is discussed. It is shown that violation of Bell s inequality is very sensitive to the probe
amplitude of the measurement system.
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It was realized very early in the history of quantum
mechanics, in particular by Heisenberg, that the mea-
surement process was an important aspect of any theory
describing natural phenomena. The measurement pro-
cess also lies at the heart of Bohr's reply to the Einstein-
Podolsky-Rosen assumption of local realism [1]. Re-
cently, two-particle interferometry has once again shown
that entanglement is an extremely important aspect of
quantum mechanics [2]. Experimental tests of quantum
mechanics as opposed to local hidden variable theories
have looked for violation of Bell s inequalities in corre-
lated two-particle systems [3, 4]. It has been suggested
that Bell's inequalities also provide a test for validation of
keys used in encrypting messages [5]. Here a message is
sent via a public channel while the key used for encryp-
tion and decryption is sent over a secure private chan-
nel. The security of the private channel can be under-
mined by the activities of an eavesdropper who can per-
form measurements on fields as they travel from source
to receiver [6]. It is the purpose of this paper to ad-
dress the questions "What are the effects of quantum-
nondemolition (QND) measurements on correlated sys-
tems?" and "What do these results mean for eavesdrop-
pers on communication systems using quantum cryptog-
raphy based on Bell's theorem?"
Consider a two-particle correlated state where each
particle travels separate paths. To be speci6c consider
a two-photon correlated state given by
)0) = 2 ' '[l*)ily)2+ ly)il~)2]
where the first ket in each term corresponds to channel
1, second ket to channel 2, and x and y refer to the po-
larization of the photon. We associate a detector Dl
with channel 1 and a detector D2 with channel 2. Be-
fore each detector is a polarizer where the positions are
denoted by 8i for Dl and 82 for D2 and the angles are
measured with respect to the x axis. Consider the joint-
detection probability P(Dl, D2~8i, Hz) for polarizers set
at angles Hi and 82 to the horizontal in channels 1 and
2, respectively. If both polarizers are present then we
know that the photons are in a pure polarization state.
But, we do not know whether it was the x or y polarized
photon in channel 1 and similarly for channel 2. Hence,
P(D1, D2~8i, Hz) must be the absolute value squared of
two probability amplitudes, one being the amplitude of
the x polarized photon being in channel 1 after the polar-
izer and the y polarized photon being in channel 2 after
its polarizer, while the other amplitude is for the reverse
situation. If one takes out the polarizer in channel 1 then
P(D1, D2~ —,Hz) becomes the sum of two probabilities
because the photon detected in channel 1 can have either
horizontal or vertical linear polarization. The amplitude
A(D1, D2~8i, 82) is given by
2 (cos Hi sin 82 + sin 8i cos 82) (2)
P(D1, D2]—,82) = 2 ([sin82] + ~cosHz~ ) = 2
These are for unit-quantum-eKciency detectors. One can
take into account the quantum efBciency by multiplying
the probabilities above by a factor rl which is assumed
independent of the polarizer settings. The quantum sys-
tem can be shown to violate the Clauser-Horne form of
the Bell inequality [8]
8 = P(D1, D2[8i, 82) —P(Dl, D2]Hi, 82)
+ P(D1, D2~8'i, 82) + P(D1, D2~8i, 82)
—P(Dl, D2iHi, —) —P(Dl, D2i —,Hz) & 0 .
We now consider the situation ln which an eavesdrop
per monitors the polarization state of a photon in one
channel, say channel 1, in a nondestructive way. The
photon is not absorbed in the measurement and is free
to propagate onto the final detector Dl, and to con-
tribute to the correlation function in Eq. (5). This kind of
measurement is referred to as a quantum-nondemolition
(QND) measurement of photon number.
The first step in realizing a polarization QND measure-
ment is to separate the beam into two components with
orthogonal polarization. The polarization directions are
chosen by the eavesdropper independent of any knowl-
edge regarding the setting of the final polarizers. Once
the beam has been split in this way, a HAND photon-
that is, the sum of two amplitudes. Hence, we can write
down the joint-detection probabilities for one and two
polarizers [7],
P(D1, D2]Hi, Hz) = 2
~
cos Hi sin 82 + sin 8i cos 82
~
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number measurement may be made on one of the sepa-
rated beams to determine if a photon is present at that
polarization. The two beams are then recombined by re-
versing the polarization splitting device (see Fig. 1). Ef-
fectively this realizes a polarization Mach-Zehnder inter-
ferometer with a QND detector in one arm. The measure-
ment model is thus equivalent to that given by Sanders
and Milburn [9], to determine which path a photon fol-
lowed in a conventional Mach-Zehnder interferometer.
The QND measurement works as follows. In one arm of
the polarization interferometer we place a Kerr medium.
This is a nonlinear optical device which induces a mu-
tual intensity dependent refractive index for each of two
beams propagating through it. One of these beams, the
signal, is the field in one arm of the polarization interfer-
ometer, the other is an independent field prepared in a
suitable state by the eavesdropper, and referred to as the
probe. The probe undergoes a phase shift proportional
to the number of photons in the signal. The measure-
ment thus reduces to the optimum strategy for detect-
ing a phase change in the probe field. Any uncertainty
in determining this phase change will translate into an
uncertainty in inferring the photon polarization of the
signal. We will follow Ref. [9] and consider quadrature
amplitude measurements on the probe. Recently such
a measurement was made using interacting solitons in a
Kerr medium (glass fiber) [10].
The interaction Hamiltonian for the two modes is
Y = (b+-bt),12 (7)
where b and bt are the annhilation and creation opera-
tors for the probe'field. For sake of simplicity we will
model such measurements via projection of the probe
states onto the eigenstates of Y [ll]. However, the essen-
tial results of this paper do not depend on how informa-
tion is extracted from the probe, after interaction with
the signal.
The signal of interest is the difference in the quadrature
amplitude readout when a photon is present in the signal
beam and when a photon is absent. As shown in [9] the
quadrature amplitude distribution for the probe splits
into two peaks; one peak corresponding to no photon in
the signal and one peak corresponding to one photon in
the signal. Thus the quality of the measurement depends
on the separation of the peaks and their relative width.
This can be measured by the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR)
defined by
ai = nXs&~,
where n, is the photon number in the signal and n„ is
the photon number in the probe. We assume the probe
is prepared in a coherent state, where the coherent am-
plitude a is assumed real. (There is some advantage in
using a squeezed state [9].) The probe quantity measured
is quadrature amplitude
(Ecoz + Ac2I)'~2 '
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where (co —ci) is the average separation of the two peaks
and b,co i are the variances of each of the two peaks.
When the probe is prepared in a coherent state the SNR
is maximized at y = n with
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Thus the quality of the measurement may be improved
by making o. as large as possible. Physically y = vr sim-
ply means that a single photon induces the maximum
observable phase shift in the probe of 7r, while choosing
o. large means the projection of the phase shifted quadra-
ture amplitude of the probe onto the real axis will show
a large change.
The total state of the probe and polarization modes
after the interaction with the measuring device is
FIG. 1. QND photon-polarization-measurement system.
(a) depicts the QND scheme for readout of the photon num-
ber in either the 2: or y polarization mode. The signal beam
is assumed to be unafFected by the mirrors (Ml, M2) for di-
recting the probe beam. A stabilized cvr laser approximates a
coherent state probe source and has been left out to simplify
the diagram. (b) shows the QND scheme placed between the
source and detector Dl. The box labeled QND is shown in de-
tail in (a). Pl,P2—polarizers, Dl, D2—detectors, C—calcite
crystal, BS—beamsplit ter.
1
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where P is proportional to the nonlinearity and length
of the Kerr medium. Clearly only if there is one pho-
ton present in the arm containing the QND device does
the probe experience a phase shift. The reduced state
of the polarization modes after the interaction with the
measuring device is the mixed state
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I' = exp( —]o. —ne '~] ) .
This quantity is bounded 0 & I' & 1, with the value
I' = exp( —4]o, ] ),
(12)
(13)
for P = vr. Thus a very good signal-to-noise ratio for the
measurement implies that I' is very small.
The joint-detection probability at the final detectors is
easily calculated to be
&(»»I8i 8&) 2 l sin (8i+82)
I '~' —1 .+ sin(28i) sin(28') l .2
(14)
The maximum violation of the Bell inequality for the
original state given by Eq. (1) occurs for the angles 8i ——
n/8, 82 = n/4, 8i —37r/8, 8& —0. The inferred violation
of the Bell inequality as determined by the correlation
coefficient S is given by
1 1 1+Ix 2 —1
2
which decreases as I' varies from unity to zero. This
demonstrates the fundamental problem an eavesdropper
faces. The distinguishability of the two distributions not
only allows an inference as to the state of the system but
also results in the destruction of the correlation between
~' =
—,
'( l~)»&*l ly)»&yl
+ Iy)»&yl l~)»&~l
+ l~) i&&~l ly)2i &yl&c lc e ' )
+ I~)»&~l ly)1&&yl&~e ' l~)) .
This state describes the polarization modes after the
measurement summed over all possible measurement re-
sults. Note that the phase-dependent ofF-diagonal terms,
which contain information on the coherence of the orig-
inal superposed state, are modulated by a factor with
modulus squared
two nonlocal measurements.
There are a number of difficulties to be faced in at-
tempting to verify the results discussed above. The
biggest difhculty is finding a Kerr nonlinearity large
enough that one photon will produce a phase change of 7r.
With currently available nonlinearities this would require
an interaction length of the order of 10s km. In addition
the Kerr medium will probably involve additional self-
induced intensity-dependent phase shifts which may be
difficult to account for. There will also be unavoidable
losses in the medium. Such eEects will further mitigate
the extent to which the Bell inequality is violated. It
was our purpose in this paper to demonstrate that under
the very best circumstances the eavesdropper must nec-
essarily destroy nonlocal correlations in order that the
measurement be reliable. The additional complications
of realistic interactions will only make matters worse.
Recently Ekert proposed a scheme for key distribu-
tion in quantum cryptography based on the two-particle
correlated state discussed in this paper. In that work
he suggested that any eavesdropper could be detected by
monitoring the extent the data obtained violated the Bell
inequality. The model of this paper, though highly ideal-
ized, demonstrates explicitly that even the most optimal
measurement can indeed be detected in this way. It is the
purpose of the eavesdropper to not only avoid detection
but to also learn about the bit string forming the key.
In principle, no information about the key transmitted
using Ekert's scheme with photons can be gained, with
the measurement apparatus we describe, without being
caught. However, in practice one would need to introduce
a tolerance so that a key is accepted provided the inferred
violation was within an agreed tolerance level of the max-
imum. This would allow an eavesdropper to use a finite
probe amplitude without being detected. It is possible
for the communicating parties to decrease information
known by the eavesdropper using privacy amplification
by public discussion [12].
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